Active Directory Security Controls

Which settings in Active Directory should be reviewed first? Privileged groups, the tier model, Windows LAPS, Kerberos and service accounts, NTLM/LDAP settings and event monitoring.
Technical summary
Technology
Active Directory, Kerberos, Windows LAPS
Topic
Identity security
Level
Advanced
In this article8 sections

A ransomware operator’s goal is clear: domain administrator privileges. Once they get there, they push payloads to every machine via GPO, log into the backup console and disable security products. That’s why Active Directory (AD), besides being the identity center for every server, user and application in the organization, is also the center of the attack. The controls below list, in order, the places to look first in an AD environment. Once the security changes are in place, handle directory health and periodic maintenance within Active Directory and server management.

1. Shrink the privileged groups

List the memberships of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Administrators and Account/Backup/Server Operators. Take indirect memberships through nested groups into account too. Everyday accounts shouldn’t be in these groups; separate, personal administrator accounts should be used for administrators.

To see indirect memberships, Get-ADGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins" -Recursive in PowerShell is a good start. A common picture: service accounts added years ago for an installation and forgotten, still-active accounts of staff who left, vendor users added “temporarily” who became permanent. Schema Admins and Enterprise Admins should normally be empty; members are added during work that requires a schema change and removed when it’s done.

Account Operators and Backup Operators are often overlooked. An account in Backup Operators can take a copy of the NTDS.dit file on a domain controller. That means every password hash in the domain.

2. Tiered administration model

Domain controllers and identity systems (tier 0), servers (tier 1) and workstations (tier 2) should be managed with different accounts. Tier 0 accounts should sign in only on tier 0 systems and dedicated administrative workstations. That way, credentials stolen on a workstation don’t belong to a domain administrator.

For the model not to stay on paper, it has to be enforced technically. With the “Deny log on locally” and “Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services” user rights in GPO, tier 0 accounts are prevented from signing in on servers and workstations. Putting privileged accounts in the “Protected Users” group restricts NTLM use, weak Kerberos encryption and credential caching. Test before applying this group to service accounts; incompatible applications fail authentication.

The scope of tier 0 is also often drawn wrong. The hypervisor that runs the domain controllers, the backup server that backs up the DCs, the AD Connect server and AD CS servers are tier 0 too. Whoever compromises one of them has effectively compromised AD.

3. Local administrator passwords: Windows LAPS

Using the same local administrator password on all computers lets a leak on a single machine spread to all of them. Windows LAPS generates a separate, regularly rotated password for each device and stores it in AD or Entra ID.

The point to watch during setup is permission to read the password. If the group that can read LAPS passwords is kept broad, the separation LAPS provides disappears. Grant read permission per OU, only to the relevant support team. Enable the encryption option for passwords stored in AD. Check that shared local accounts created during imaging are also brought under LAPS.

4. Kerberos and service accounts

  • Service accounts with an SPN that are in privileged groups are exposed to Kerberoasting attacks; their passwords should be long and random, and group managed service accounts (gMSA) should be used where possible.
  • Identify unconstrained delegation configurations and remove them or convert them to constrained delegation.
  • Review the use of weak Kerberos encryption types such as RC4.
  • Reset the KRBTGT account password in a planned way, in two stages.

To list user accounts with SPNs, you can use Get-ADUser -Filter 'ServicePrincipalName -like "*"' -Properties ServicePrincipalName,PasswordLastSet. A SQL service account whose PasswordLastSet value points to years ago is one of the most common findings. In Kerberoasting, the attacker requests a ticket for this account with any domain user and tries to crack the password offline. A short password gets cracked quickly.

To find unconstrained delegation, run Get-ADComputer -Filter 'TrustedForDelegation -eq $true'. Domain controllers appear in this list by default; anything else should be examined. When resetting KRBTGT, make sure AD replication completes between the two changes and wait at least one ticket lifetime (10 hours by default). Two resets back to back invalidate all existing Kerberos tickets and cause a service outage.

5. NTLM and LDAP settings

Disable NTLMv1 and LM authentication, and reduce NTLM use by auditing it. Make credential relay attacks harder by enabling LDAP signing and channel binding settings.

The order matters. Audit first, then restrict. With the “Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain” policy, see the clients and applications using NTLM; before setting “LAN Manager authentication level” to “Send NTLMv2 response only. Refuse LM & NTLM”, identify old printers, NAS devices and applications. On the LDAP side, domain controllers write event 2887 (daily summary) for unsigned connections in the Directory Service log, and 2889 (per client) when diagnostic logging is enabled. Making the “Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements” policy mandatory before these events stop breaks the LDAP queries of scanners and old applications.

6. GPO and AD CS

Who has permission to edit critical Group Policy objects? Are there passwords in GPO scripts? If Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is used, do certificate template permissions allow an ordinary user to obtain a certificate on behalf of an administrator? These questions are an important part of the audit.

Scan SYSVOL. If a cpassword field remains in XML files created with the old Group Policy Preferences, that password can be decrypted with a key anyone can read. Plain-text passwords in logon scripts are also a common finding. In AD CS, the most dangerous configuration is a template where the requester can specify the subject name themselves (“Supply in the request”), that carries the client authentication purpose and grants enrollment permission to the Domain Users group. This combination allows an ordinary user to obtain a certificate on behalf of a domain admin and sign in.

7. Monitoring

Event Why monitor it?
Adding members to privileged groups The clearest sign of privilege escalation
Many failed sign-ins Password spraying or brute force
New service or scheduled task Persistence and lateral movement
Clearing the event log An attempt to erase traces

The Windows counterparts of these events: 4728, 4732 and 4756 for adding members to security groups; 4625 for a failed sign-in and 4771 for a Kerberos pre-authentication failure; 7045 in the System log for a new service installation; 4698 for creating a scheduled task; 1102 for clearing the security log. For the events to be generated, Advanced Audit Policy settings need to be enabled on domain controllers and servers. Default audit settings are often insufficient. If logs stay only on the DC, an attack that clears the log takes the trail with it; that’s why sending them to a central log system is essential.

Recommendation for the first 30 days

  1. Clean up privileged groups and separate administrator accounts.
  2. Roll out Windows LAPS.
  3. Identify privileged accounts with SPNs and strengthen their passwords.
  4. Send critical events to the central log system.

These four steps don’t require a big project; they’re done with existing tools. The tier model, NTLM restrictions and AD CS fixes, however, need testing and a migration plan. Plan them for the second phase, together with application owners.

For a comprehensive review, see our Active Directory Security Audit page; for administrator access, Privileged Access Management; and for the server side, System and Server Hardening.

Support

Contact us for support or a discovery session on this topic.

Contact form
[email protected]

Eretek Cybersecurity

Firewall, VPN, endpoint security and threat prevention. We reduce the attack surface and measure and report the risks.

Knowledge Center

Other articles