The prototype room is locked, there’s badge access, and the camera is recording. The CAD model of the same part, however, sits on the “Engineering” share, in a folder everyone in the department can read. At an automotive supplier, prototype information isn’t just the physical part: the CAD model, the revision history in the PLM, simulation results, test bench measurement data and a photo taken in the workshop are all prototype information. This guide explains the technical controls for digital prototype data for the IT and security teams of organizations to be assessed against TISAX prototype protection objectives: project-based access, network separation in the prototype area, data transfer with customers, mobile device and image capture restrictions, and the evidence for them.
The scope of digital data in prototype protection
In TISAX, the assessment objectives for prototype protection are defined under prototype parts and components (Proto parts), prototype vehicles (Proto vehicles), test vehicles (Test vehicles) and events and shootings (Proto events). The objective, assessment level, scope and label are separate concepts; according to the table in the ENX participant handbook, the first two objectives are assessed at AL3 and the last two at AL2. The prototype protection section of the VDA ISA catalog mainly covers physical security, organizational arrangements and rules for handling vehicles/parts. Digital prototype data, on the other hand, is questioned in practice through the requirements in the catalog’s information security section (access management, cryptography, network security, mobile devices, data transfer) and usually falls into the high or very high protection need class. Verify the question numbers and the label–question mapping in the ISA version you use from the current ENX and VDA documents; the numbers shift between versions.
The physical and organizational side (security zones, visitor rules, confidentiality commitments) is in the TISAX prototype protection requirements article on the compliance site. Here there are only technical controls. Start by mapping out where prototype data is created and where it travels:
| Data type | Typical location | Main risk |
|---|---|---|
| CAD model and drawing | PLM/PDM, engineer workstation | Unauthorized project access, local copies |
| Simulation and calculation | HPC cluster, shared disk | Broad share permissions |
| Test and measurement data | Test bench PC, lab server | Unpatched devices not on a separate network |
| Photos and video | Phones, quality cameras | Uncontrolled shooting and sharing |
| Customer correspondence | Email, customer portal | Wrong recipient, unencrypted attachment |
Project-based access separation
The technical basis is one sentence: moving from a “the engineering department sees everything” model to a “only the person assigned to a project sees that project’s data” model. A customer expects information about its project not to reach people at the same supplier who work on another customer’s project. The competing OEM’s project is one corridor away.
Implementation steps:
- A group per project: Separate security groups (for example read and write) are created in the directory for each customer project. The group owner is the project manager; membership requests are processed with their approval, and IT doesn’t add members on its own.
- Project-based access in the PLM: PLM systems such as Teamcenter, Windchill and 3DEXPERIENCE have project- or context-based access models. These models are used instead of broad role-based access (such as the whole product tree for the entire “designer” role) and are mapped to directory groups.
- File shares: Inheritance is broken on project folders outside the PLM; only the project groups and an administrator group reserved for management are authorized.
- Project closure: When the project ends, the groups are emptied, the data is moved to an archive, and archive access is restricted separately. A project group that’s never closed is a door left open for years.
A simple and powerful way to show the separation is really in place is to export folder permissions regularly:
$projects = Get-ChildItem -Path "\\fs01\Prototype" -Directory
$result = foreach ($p in $projects) {
(Get-Acl -Path $p.FullName).Access |
Select-Object @{n='Project';e={$p.Name}}, IdentityReference,
FileSystemRights, AccessControlType, IsInherited
}
$result | Export-Csv -Path .\prototype_acl.csv -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8
If you see “Domain Users”, “Everyone”, “Authenticated Users” or a department-wide group in the output, or if there are broad inherited permissions (IsInherited = True), those are findings to fix. A picture that comes up often: the folder was set up correctly, but the “Engineering_Read” group inherited from the parent folder is still on the list.
Local copies on engineer workstations are a separate risk. Disk encryption, blocking USB storage and data loss prevention rules that recognize CAD file types (for example .CATPart, .prt, .jt, .stp) are applied together. If one is missing, the chain breaks. For highly sensitive projects, a virtual desktop or remote graphics workstation model in which the data never lands on the workstation is also considered.
Network separation in prototype areas
Computers, measuring devices and cameras in the prototype workshop, test lab and vehicle areas are often connected “flat” to the corporate network. The result is a two-way risk: prototype data is accessible from anywhere in the organization, and unpatched test devices become an open door for the corporate network and enterprise cybersecurity. Seeing a PC still running an unsupported operating system on a test bench isn’t surprising in the field.
- A separate segment: A separate VLAN for prototype areas, with traffic between zones going through the firewall. Separating VLANs alone isn’t enough; rules between zones must be defined (see the difference between VLANs and real network security). No rules, no separation.
- Allow-list rules: From the prototype segment, only necessary destinations such as the PLM server, license server, and patching and security infrastructure are allowed. Internet access is off or restricted through a proxy.
- Wireless network: No guest network is broadcast in the prototype area; the corporate wireless network is open only to managed devices with 802.1X.
- Port security: Unused network sockets in the workshop are disabled or protected with NAC; a visitor can’t plug in a laptop and get onto the network.
- Test devices: For devices that need the manufacturer’s remote maintenance connection, approved, time-limited and recorded access is used instead of a permanent tunnel. A forgotten maintenance VPN is a back door we often find.
Secure data transfer with customers
The most fragile moment for prototype data is when it leaves the organization. In automotive, there are established methods for transferring engineering data, and the method is often set by the customer:
| Method | Strength | Point to watch |
|---|---|---|
| OFTP2 (ODETTE) | Encryption, signing and delivery receipts in the protocol | Certificate management and expiry tracking |
| Customer portal | The customer manages access | Portal accounts are personal, MFA on |
| Corporate secure file sharing | A time-limited, person-specific link | Anonymous links off, download logs |
| Email attachment | Easy | Should be avoided for prototype data |
Whatever the method, who made the transfer, with which file and to which recipient should be on record. In cloud sharing, technically turning off anonymous (“anyone with the link”) sharing in prototype project areas is more reliable than banning it by policy. A ban is forgotten; a setting isn’t. Verifying the TLS and encryption settings used in transfer is covered in the encryption controls guide.
Mobile device and image capture restrictions
The most common leak path in the prototype area isn’t technical. It’s a phone camera. Here physical and technical controls work together:
- Personal devices: Because they can’t be managed technically, the control is physical: drop-off lockers at the entrance or security stickers that cover cameras.
- Corporate phones and tablets: Camera restrictions can be applied with MDM. In Microsoft Intune, the camera can be blocked on iOS/iPadOS and Android Enterprise corporate devices with device restriction profiles. Devices of staff working in the prototype area are put in a separate group and the profile is assigned to that group.
- Approved capture devices: If photos are needed for documentation, specific cameras from the organization’s inventory are used that don’t connect to the network or connect only to the prototype segment; images are transferred directly to the project folder and deleted from the device.
- Video surveillance cameras: CCTV recordings covering the prototype area are also prototype information; access to the recorder and exporting recordings are limited by authorization. That’s why an NVR’s default administrator password is a serious finding.
- Meetings and screen sharing: In meetings involving prototype data, recording and external participant permissions are restricted; if sensitivity labels are used, the label determines meeting and file sharing behavior.
Technical evidence for the controls
In the assessment, you’re expected to show that the control works, not the policy. Preparing the evidence in advance and keeping it current avoids a rush for screenshots in assessment week. For general preparation, see the TISAX preparation process and technical evidence article; a typical evidence set for prototype data is:
- The list of project groups, their members and the date of the last review; an export of project folder ACLs.
- Configuration output of the PLM access model and a test record showing an unauthorized user can’t access a sample project.
- The prototype segment’s firewall rules and a sample of inter-zone traffic logs.
- A NAC or port status report for network sockets in the prototype area.
- The MDM camera restriction profile, the group it’s assigned to and the list of compliant devices.
- Data transfer records: OFTP2 or portal logs, an external sharing report.
- The DLP rule definition for CAD file types and an incident report for the latest period.
- A status report on disk encryption and USB storage blocking on engineer workstations.
To test this evidence with an independent eye before the assessment, a control and configuration audit can be done, and for designing content-based rules for CAD and engineering data, a data loss prevention (DLP) project. TISAX assessment objectives and process documents are published on the ENX Association website.
Frequently asked questions
Is digital CAD data within the scope of the TISAX prototype label?
The prototype protection section mainly covers physical prototypes, vehicles and photography rules. Digital prototype information such as CAD and test data is assessed in practice through the information security requirements. That’s why an organization targeting a prototype label should treat digital data with a high protection need too.
Is a separate VLAN enough for the prototype area?
No. A VLAN only separates the broadcast domain. Traffic into and out of the segment should be limited with firewall rules on an allow-list basis, internet access should be restricted, and unused ports should be protected with NAC or disabled.
Can the cameras of personal phones be blocked technically?
On personal devices the organization doesn’t manage, the camera can’t be reliably blocked technically. For these devices, physical controls such as drop-off lockers at the entrance or camera-covering stickers are applied; on corporate devices, camera restrictions can be enforced with MDM.
What should be done if a customer sends a CAD file by email?
The file is moved to the project folder or the PLM, and the copy in the email is handled according to the organization’s retention rule. The lasting solution is to agree with the customer on a transfer method that keeps records, such as OFTP2, a customer portal, or person-specific, time-limited secure sharing.