Migrating to Windows LAPS: Managing Local Administrator Passwords

How do you move from legacy LAPS to Windows LAPS? The AD or Entra ID store, encryption, DSRM, schema and permission commands, GPO/Intune settings and password read auditing.
Technical summary
Technology
Windows LAPS, Active Directory, Microsoft Entra ID, Intune, Group Policy, PowerShell
Topic
Managing local administrator passwords with Windows LAPS
Level
Intermediate
Prerequisites
  • Schema Admins and Domain Admins rights (for the AD store)
  • Supported Windows versions and current updates
  • The OU structure and tier-based administrator groups
In this article8 sections

On computers deployed from an image, the local Administrator password is usually the same on every machine. An attacker roams the whole fleet with the password hash taken from a single device. Windows LAPS generates a device-specific local administrator password for each device, rotates it regularly and stores it in protected form in Active Directory or Microsoft Entra ID. Below we explain choosing the store, the schema and permission steps, GPO/Intune settings and the traps most often fallen into, whether migrating from the old Microsoft LAPS or installing from scratch.

The risk of a shared local administrator password

Authentication for local accounts doesn’t go to the domain controller; the password hash sits in the machine’s SAM database. An attacker who gains administrator rights on a workstation reads this hash. If the same password is used on other machines, there’s no need to even crack the hash: pass-the-hash is enough to sign in on the other machines. An incident that starts with a single phishing email thus spreads to all workstations and servers sharing the same password. If the password is the same, there’s no boundary.

This is the problem LAPS solves: each device generates its own password, changes it within a set period and writes it somewhere only authorized groups can read. Within the Active Directory tier model, it’s one of the basic controls that cuts lateral movement between Tier 2 and Tier 1.

The difference between legacy LAPS and Windows LAPS

The old Microsoft LAPS is a Group Policy client-side extension (CSE) installed with a separate MSI. Windows LAPS, on the other hand, is a feature added to Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2019 and 2022 with the April 2023 updates, and built into Windows Server 2025. The old Microsoft LAPS has been deprecated in Windows 11 23H2 and later; new versions block installation of the old MSI package. Verify the current list of supported versions in Microsoft’s documentation.

Feature Legacy Microsoft LAPS Windows LAPS
Setup Separate MSI and CSE Built into the operating system
Store AD only AD or Entra ID
Storage in AD Plain text, confidential attribute Encrypted (DFL 2016+) or plain text
Password history None Yes (with encryption on)
DSRM password Not managed Managed (AD, encrypted)
Post-use action None Rotate the password, sign out, restart
Management tools AdmPwd.PS module LAPS PowerShell module, Intune

Legacy LAPS keeps the password in plain text in the ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute. The attribute being marked “confidential” limits reading to those with the “All Extended Rights” right; but in the field we often see this right handed out to broad groups on OUs. In Windows LAPS’s encrypted mode, the password is kept in the msLAPS-EncryptedPassword attribute; reading it requires both attribute permission and being in a group with decryption rights.

The password store: AD or Entra ID

A device backs up its password to a single store; the choice is made with the BackupDirectory setting (AD or Entra ID). The decision depends on the device’s identity state and who will need the password under what conditions.

  • Entra ID-only joined devices: The store is Entra ID. Passwords are read from the Entra admin center or Intune by roles with the relevant permission.
  • Hybrid-joined devices: Both options are possible. AD may be preferred for the on-premises support team and servers, and Entra ID for laptops that mostly work remotely and are managed with Intune. Two stores can’t be used together on the same device.
  • Servers and domain controllers: AD is recommended. The DSRM password is backed up only to AD and only with encryption on.

For the Entra ID store, first turn on the Microsoft Entra LAPS setting under Devices > Device settings in the Entra admin center. If it’s off, the device’s backup attempt fails; you see an error in the event log but no password appears in the portal. This is the first place to look.

Schema update and permissions (PowerShell)

For the AD store, the schema is extended once, then permissions are granted for each target OU. The commands are in the LAPS PowerShell module that comes with Windows LAPS. The schema update requires Schema Admins membership.

Import-Module LAPS

# 1. Add the Windows LAPS attributes to the schema (once per forest)
Update-LapsADSchema -Verbose

# 2. Permission for computers to write their own passwords
Set-LapsADComputerSelfPermission -Identity "OU=Workstations,DC=corp,DC=local"

# 3. Password read and reset rights (only for the relevant groups)
Set-LapsADReadPasswordPermission -Identity "OU=Workstations,DC=corp,DC=local" `
    -AllowedPrincipals "CORP\T2-LAPS-Support"
Set-LapsADResetPasswordPermission -Identity "OU=Workstations,DC=corp,DC=local" `
    -AllowedPrincipals "CORP\T2-LAPS-Support"

# 4. Audit who holds extended rights on the OU
Find-LapsADExtendedRights -Identity "OU=Workstations,DC=corp,DC=local"

Split permissions according to the tier structure: the Tier 2 support group holds read rights on the workstation OU, and the Tier 1 group on the server OUs. A help desk group that can read server passwords punches through the tier separation via LAPS. In encrypted mode, who can decrypt the password is set separately with the ADPasswordEncryptionPrincipal setting; the default is the Domain Admins group, and different groups can be defined per OU.

Policy configuration with GPO and Intune

In on-premises management, the settings are under Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > System > LAPS. In Intune, the same settings are delivered with the “Local admin password solution (Windows LAPS)” profile under Endpoint security > Account protection. The same device shouldn’t receive both a GPO and an Intune policy; if the two sources conflict, you end up guessing which setting wins.

Setting Recommended value Note
Configure password backup directory Active Directory or Entra ID One store per device
Password Settings Length 14+, complex; age 30 days Age at least 7 days in the Entra store
Name of administrator account to manage The name, if a custom account is used If empty, the built-in Administrator is managed
Enable password encryption Enabled Requires DFL 2016
Configure size of encrypted password history A few entries For the old password when restoring from backup
Post-authentication actions Rotate the password and sign out The delay is set in hours
Enable password backup for DSRM accounts Enabled on DCs AD only, with encryption on

Windows LAPS doesn’t create a custom account to manage by default; the account must have been created beforehand another way (GPO preferences, Intune or a script). Newer Windows versions also have automatic account management options where LAPS manages the account itself; before using them, verify they’re supported on your target operating system version.

Verification on the device after the policy is applied:

# Process the policy immediately and watch the result in the event log
Invoke-LapsPolicyProcessing
Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-LAPS/Operational" -MaxEvents 20 |
    Select-Object TimeCreated, Id, Message

# Read the password from an authorized management workstation (AD store)
Get-LapsADPassword -Identity "PC-0142" -AsPlainText

# Entra ID store (requires a Microsoft Graph session)
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Device.Read.All","DeviceLocalCredential.Read.All"
Get-LapsAADPassword -DeviceIds "PC-0142" -IncludePasswords -AsPlainText

For troubleshooting, Get-LapsDiagnostics collects detailed logs and produces an archive file. Attaching this archive to the support ticket takes the guesswork out of a “the password isn’t showing” complaint.

Auditing password read rights

From an enterprise cybersecurity perspective, LAPS’s value is complete when you know who reads the password. To audit reads in the AD store, a SACL is added on the OU:

Set-LapsADAuditing -Identity "OU=Workstations,DC=corp,DC=local" `
    -AuditedPrincipals "Everyone" -AuditType Success

For this SACL to generate events, the “Audit Directory Service Access” subcategory must be enabled on domain controllers; reads appear as event 4662 in the DC security log and should be sent to the SIEM. In the Entra ID store, password views are written to the Entra audit log. The expected behavior is the same on both sides: every read matches a support ticket, and the password rotates automatically after the read via the post-authentication action. A read without a ticket is a matter for investigation.

When the password needs to be rotated manually, Reset-LapsPassword is run on the device; in the AD store, rotation at the next policy cycle can be forced with Set-LapsADPasswordExpirationTime.

Common mistakes in the field during migration

When migrating from legacy LAPS, the one fixed rule is this: the two solutions mustn’t manage the same account at the same time. If both change the same account at different times, the password stored in AD doesn’t match the real password and the support team is left in front of a locked machine. The recommended order:

  1. Update the schema and grant the Windows LAPS permissions on a pilot OU.
  2. Apply the Windows LAPS policy on pilot devices; if possible, start by managing a different local account, or remove the legacy policy at the same time.
  3. Verify that the passwords appear in the new attribute and that the authorized group can read them.
  4. Remove the legacy GPO, then the old CSE; narrow the read permissions on the old ms-Mcs-AdmPwd values.
  5. Roll out OU by OU, in waves.

Other common mistakes:

  • Leaving the permissions only on the old OU when moving computer objects; the device can’t write its password in the new OU.
  • Granting read permission to Domain Users or broad support groups; never reviewing the Find-LapsADExtendedRights output.
  • Forgetting that on a device restored from backup, a password from history is valid rather than the current one; password history is kept exactly for this situation.
  • Starting to manage the DSRM password without writing it into the AD disaster recovery procedure.

The DSRM password becomes decisive in a forest recovery scenario; the process is described in the AD forest recovery after a ransomware attack article, and the restore steps with DSRM in the Active Directory backup and restore guide. To evaluate LAPS together with the other AD controls, see the Active Directory security controls article. The official description of all settings is in Microsoft’s Windows LAPS documentation. For an assessment of your current setup, see our Active Directory security audit service, and for endpoint and server configuration, our system and server hardening service.

Frequently asked questions

Do we need to install separate software for Windows LAPS?

No. Since the April 2023 updates, Windows LAPS is part of the operating system on supported Windows client and server versions. For the AD store, a schema update and OU permissions are enough; for the Entra ID store, turning on the LAPS setting in the Entra admin center is enough.

Can Windows LAPS and legacy LAPS run at the same time?

They can coexist in the same environment during the migration, but they mustn’t manage the same local account at the same time. Otherwise the two solutions change the password at different times and the password in the directory doesn’t match the real password. During migration, either a different account is managed, or the legacy policy is removed and the device is handed over to Windows LAPS.

Which domain functional level is required for password encryption?

For encrypting Windows LAPS passwords stored in AD, password history and DSRM password backup, the domain functional level must be at least Windows Server 2016. At a lower level, Windows LAPS can store the password in plain text, but these features can’t be used.

How do you track who reads the LAPS password?

In the AD store, an audit entry is added on the OU with Set-LapsADAuditing and Directory Service Access auditing is turned on on domain controllers; reads appear as event 4662. In the Entra ID store, password views are written to the Entra audit log. Both sources should be sent to the SIEM and matched against support tickets.

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